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COMMENTS ON SELECTED PROVISIONS OF THE
NEW MINNESOTA RULES
GUNNAR

A

H.

NORDBYE*

outset, it may be noted that, when the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure were adopted, the prevailing practice in Minnesota played an important part in the formulation of many of the
rules. This was due no doubt to the important contribution of
William D. Mitchell, a distinguished son of Minnesota, who served
as Chairman of the Committee which drafted the rules, and the late
Professor Cherry of the Minnesota Law School, who also was a
member of that Committee. Moreover, the local Federal judges,
with a Committee of the Minnesota Bar, spent a great deal of time
in formulating a proposed set of rules for the consideration of the
national Committee. The Minnesota lawyers, therefore, will not
find themselves in an entirely strange field in proceeding under the
new Minnesota rules which are patterned upon the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.
For the purpose of clarification, reference may be made in my
discussion from time to time regarding the similarity or differences
as between the new Minnesota rules and the Federal rules, and also
as to the differences between the new Minnesota rules and the superseded Minnesota statutory provisions.
T
THE

Rule 39.02. Advisory jury and Trial by Consent
The significant change or modification in this rule over the
Minnesota statute, § 546.03, is to be found in the provision of the
rule which changes the former Minnesota practice, in that under
this rule the court cannot, without the consent of the parties, call
a jury in a non-jury case to decide the fact issues. That is, a party
can insist in a non-jury case that the issue be determined ultimately
by the court even though the court determines that an advisory jury
may be called. Under § 546.03, which now is superseded partially,
the court of its own motion in a jury-waived case, could order a
jury as in ordinary jury trial controversies.
Rule 41. Dismissal of Actions
This rule departs somewhat from the present Federal Rule 41.
Under the Federal rule, a dismissal without order of court may be
made at any time by plaintiff before answer has been served, or a
*United States District judge for the District of Minnesota.
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motion for summary judgment, whichever comes first. But, under the
Minnesota rule, a dismissal may be made without order of court by
the filing of a notice of dismissal not less than ten days before the opening of the term, or in counties such as Hennepin and Ramsey, where
there are continuous terms of court, not less than ten days before
the date on which the case first is set for trial, provided a provisional
remedy has not been made or a counterclaim or other affirmative
relief demanded in the answer. Provisional remedies, as you know,
are injunctions, appointments of receivers, attachments, etc. Under
the present Minnesota law, a plaintiff may dismiss an action at any
time without leave of court before the trial actually commences.
But, under the new rule the dismissal must be made before the
ten-day period as outlined in the rule. The Minnesota rule is a sort
of compromise between the Federal rule and the prior Minnesota
statutory provision. In any event, plaintiff cannot wait until the
day of trial and after defendant has been put to the expense of
preparing for trial and then dismiss his case without order of court.
A dismissal by the plaintiff in accordance with Rule 41.01 (1) prior
to the ten-day period, as set forth in the rule, is a dismissal without
prejudice. But such a dismissal is tantamount to one with prejudice
if an action based upon the same claim has once been dismissed in
any court in the United States or of any State. You will note that,
except as provided in Rule 41.01(1), a dismissal cannot be entered except by order of court under Rule 41.01(2). Under this
latter section, the dismissal with the consent of court is usually without prejudice, but may be made on terms that will tend to prevent
the laxity with which suits are often prosecuted and the harrassment which often results to litigants by suits that are commenced
without any intention of actually proceeding to trial. Counterclaims
set up in the answer are to remain intact as an independent proceeding regardless of any dismissal in absence of a stipulation providing otherwise. Where a dismissal is made only upon obtaining
consent of the Court, conditions may be provided and costs allowed,
and those costs should not be only nominal. They should recognize
the extent of the preparation that defendant has been subjected
to in preparing his answer and getting ready for trial, and if the
courts follow the practice of assessing substantial costs, such practice will tend materially to lessen the institution of frivolous and
unmeritorious lawsuits.
Comment may be made as to Rule 41.02. This rule adopts Federal Rule 41 (b), as amended, and it may, be noted that a dismissal
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under this section is on the merits unless the Court specifies otherwise; that is, a dismissal for failure to prosecute or to comply with
the rules or any order of the court operates as an adjudication
upon the merits unless a dismissal is for lack of jurisdiction. Presumably, the right of dismissal for failure to comply with the rule
or any order of the court embraces many derelictions on the part
of the litigants and their counsel; for instance, if the pleader fails
to comply with the rule governing pleading and such requirements
as are set forth in Rules 10 and 12 governing forms of pleading,
etc. It may also arise on the failure of the plaintiff to produce certain documents or the refusal of the plaintiff to submit to a physical
examination or to make answers to interrogatories. Such a dismissal
would be on the merits unless the court otherwise provides. But
the court would be required to exercise a reasonable and sound
discretion. As you will note in Rule 41.02, if plaintiff has rested,
a motion for dismissal may be made upon the grounds that, upon
the facts and the law, plaintiff has established no grounds for relief.
A motion for dismissal on the merits at the end of plaintiff's case
may be made in jury as well as in non-jury cases, and there is no
need for counsel for defendant to go through the formality of obtaining the consent of the court to rest with the right to reopen if
the motion for dismissal is denied. A dismissal at the end of plaintiff's case usually will result in a dismissal on the merits unless
the court provides otherwise. Furthermore, at the close of plaintiff's
testimony, the trial court in granting such a motion may weigh
the testimony and in effect test the credibility of the witnesses,
and upon plaintiff's evidence alone, without waiting for defendant's
testimony, determine the controversy on the merits if such a disposition seems appropriate. Under such circumstances, the court
shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as provided in
Rule 52.01 and the case would be disposed of accordingly.
Rule 42. Consolidation: Separate Trials.
Rule 42.01, which provides for consolidation, and Rule 42.02,
which provides for separate trials, are broader and more liberal
than the superseded Minnesota statute, § 546.04, which provides
for consolidation and separate trials. Under the new Minnesota
rule, in order to permit consolidation, the actions need not be between the same parties, a condition which must have existed under
the Minnesota statute before there could be a consolidation. Consequently, under the new rule, it is sufficient for consolidation if
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the actions pending before the court involve common questions of
law and fact. And it is not necessary that the causes of action might
have been joined, because under the new rule any actions having
common questions of law and fact may proceed before the court
under a joint hearing, or with a trial of one or more of the issues
in common, or a complete consolidation.
Rule 42.01, which is the consolidation section, may be utilized
where there are a large number of plaintiffs suing a railroad, for
instance, for ersonal injuries growing out of the same railroad
accident. Under such circumstances, the court may order a joint
trial in that the negligence issue would be the same, and arrange for
separate verdicts being returned for each plaintiff as to the damages. Then there may be suits which involve claims by several passengers in an automobile collision against the same defendant. No
good reason will appear generally why these actions should not
be consolidated. Or there may be stockholder actions brought by
different plaintiffs. Then, again, take, for instance, condemnation
suits. Where a group of landowners have the same type of land
under condemnation it would be expeditious to require a consolidation of a reasonable number of these claims so that one jury might
pass upon all claims and render separate awards to each landowner.
Separate trials under § 546.04 of the Minnesota statutes may
be ordered between plaintiff and any of the several defendants in
the same action only when in the opinion of the court justice may
be promoted thereby. The new rule 42.02 requiring separate trials
seems particularly necessary in view of the liberality which the
rules provide for joinder of claims, parties and actions. Attention
may be directed to Rule 21, Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure,
which provides that misjoinder of parties is not a ground for dismissal of an action and that any claim against a party may be severed
and proceeded with separately. Then we have third-party proceedings which may at times suggest the necessity of a separate trial.
Again, there may be legal and equitable issues joined, with legal
issues triable to a jury and equitable issues to the court. Avoidance of prejudice may suggest separation of trial. Furthermore,
there may be occasions when separate trials should be ordered upon
counter-claims or cross-bills. If the defense of res adjudicata or the
statute of limitations is interposed, and the lawsuit involves a long,
protracted trial, there is no good reason, of course, why separate
trials could not be afforded on these defenses which may avoid the
necessity of proceeding with a long trial.
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Rule 43. Evidence
This rule pertains to the broad subject of "Evidence," which includes admissibility of evidence, competency of witnesses; scope
of examination and cross-examination; record of excluded evidence;
affirmation in lieu of oath; evidence, both oral and written, on the
hearing of motions; and res ipsa loquitur.
The question of the admissibility of proffered evidence in a hotly
contested lawsuit often presents a perplexing probltem to the trial
judge. New and novel questions of evidence frequently arise during
the trial without any opportunity for the court to give the matter
considered study before ruling. Trial judges must recognize that
they are not so gifted or so infallible as the baseball umpire about
whom the story is told that when he was asked about his experiences as a major league umpire and the decisions made during an
important ball game, the observation was made that no doubt the
umpire called them as he saw them. But the response of the umpire
was, "No, sir. I calls them as they are."
At the outset, it may be noted that the subject of "Evidence" is
touched upon, as one commentator expressed it, "quite gently."
Certainly, there is nothing new or startling in Rule 43.01 which pertains to the form and admissibility of evidence. It may be stated,
however, that the intent and purpose of the rule is to favor the reception of evidence if the statute or rules favor it. Liberality in admitting evidence is assumed to be the very evident purpose of this
rule. Undoubtedly, the framers of the Minnesota rules were confronted with the same problem which disturbed the framers of the
Federal rules. Everyone recognized that a comprehensive and
detailed set of rules of evidence would be helpful, but the task
would be a formidable one and undoubtedly it would be difficult to
obtain a satisfactory working rule on such a comprehensive subject. It would be more of a treatise than a rule.
Then we come to Rule 43.02, and this rule, of course, pertains
to the familiar practice of calling an adverse party for crossexamination under the statute. However, the rule supersedes
§ 595.03 of our statutes and there are some significant changes to be
noted. As under the 1949 amendment to the Minnesota statute, not
only a managing agent, but an employee of an adverse party may
now be called for cross-examination. This broadens and materially
liberalizes the scope of calling for cross-examination a representative of an adverse party. The test as to whether the witness is a
managing agent, superintendent, or officer of a corporate defendant
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no longer applies under the new rule. Perhaps more of an innovation is the procedure which permits the adverse party to likewise
cross-examine the witness called under the rule. And not only may
such witness be cross-examined by the adverse party, but where
the witness is an officer, director, managing agent, or employee,
he may be contradicted and impeached by or on behalf of the adverse party also. Note, however, that the contradiction and impeachment of such a witness is limited to situations where the witness is
an officer, director, managing agent, or employee. Evidently, therefore, where an adverse party as such, that is, an individual adverse
party, or members of a partnership are called for cross-examination,
they may be cross-examined by the adverse party but the impeachment and contradiction of such a witness is not permitted.
It is singular that most trial lawyers do not seem to appreciate
the changes in this rule; that is, the changes that exist in comparison
to the Minnesota statutory rule in permitting the cross-examination
of an adverse party. Even under our Federal practice the lawyers
do not seem to sense the liberality which is permitted in crossexamination by both parties as well as the contradiction and impeachment of the witness as the rule permits. So often when a
witness is called for cross-examination under the Federal rule, and
when such witness is turned over to the adverse party for crossexamination, it is assumed that the adverse party is limited to socalled direct examination upon the subject matter of his examination in chief. Obviously, however, the rule permits either party to
cross-examine any witness called for cross-examination under the
rule.
Professor Moore makes the following comment regarding Federal rule 43 (b) :
"The clause 'and the witness thus called may be contradicted
and impeached by or on behalf of the adverse party also, and
may be cross-examined by the adverse party only upon the subject matter of his examination in chief' is to protect the corporation or partnership in the case where one of its officers, directors,
etc., has been called by the adverse party, and has, so to speak,
gone over to the enemy. The corporation or partnership has the
same latitude to contradict or impeach such an officer, etc., as
the adverse party enjoyed, but 'only upon the subject matter
of his examination in chief.' "
It would seem, however, that where there is no showing that the
officer, director, or employee called for an adverse examination "has
gone over to the enemy," reasonable limits or restriction might
1. See 5 Moore, Federal Practice 1348 (2d ed. 1951).
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properly be placed by the court on leading questions or questions
which suggest answers which may be used by counsel in examining
the officers and representatives of his own client who were called
for cross-examination under this rule. But, in any event, in
considering Rule 43.02, counsel must bear in mind that when a
witness is called for cross-examination under this rule, he in
effect becomes a free lance witness subject to cross-examination
by either side and subject to contradiction and impeachment by
either side in the event he is an officer, managing agent, director, or
employee, and not an individuel adverse party. The situation under
this rule reminds one of the query that was propounded to one of
the commentators when the Federal rules were being considered
as to the cross-examination of a hostile witness, and the questioner
wanted to know under these circumstances whose witness the witness became. The response was that it was something like the
situation which existed during Biblical times when the Pharisees
had the custom that a widow was required to marry the brother of
her deceased husband in the event any unwed brothers remained,
and in this particular instance there were seven brothers and the
widow had the good fortune, or the bad fortune, of having the respective brothers that she married pass on until she had married
all seven. And the Master was interrogated as to whose wife she
would be at the Resurrection.
This brings me to Rule 43.03, Record of Excluded Evidence.
There is nothing new in this provision regarding the customary
offer of proof; that is, when the court sustains the objection to a
question in a case tried with a jury. But in non-jury cases, the
court on sustaining an objection to a question, on request, must
take and report the proffered evidence in full unless it clearly
appears that the evidence is not admissible on any ground or the
witness is privileged. When an offer of proof is made, it is often
couched in broad, general language which renders the offer difficult
to appraise as constituting admissible or non-admissible evidence.
When, however, the witness is permitted to answer the question,
and the evidence is reported in full, the details of the offer are in the
form of testimony and enables the trial court to determine its admissibility more clearly. Then, on appeal, in the event any question
is raised as to the admissibility of this testimony, the appellate court
has the testimony before it and can determine whether any prejudicial error has been committed by its admission or its exclusion. If
it was excluded, and if the appellate court determines that it should
have been received, then the appellate court may consider the evi-
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dence in determining whether or not the ruling of the trial court
was justified and whether a reversal should be made because of
such error. Obviously, if an offer of proof pertains to testimony
which would involve a futile ceremony or is clearly inadmissible, the
court should not encumber the record, but should limit counsel to
his offer of proof. Where, however, testimony has been taken and
an objection to the testimony sustained, and if on appeal it appears
that the trial court erred, the appellate court then may send the
matter for further consideration by the trial court on the proffered
evidence and such practice may obviate an entire new trial.
Rule 43.05 refers to Evidence and Motions. Motions which are
not based upon the record are usually presented upon affidavits, but
this section provides flexibility in this regard so that the court may
determine that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions. There are frequent occasions when the court
should hesitate to determine questions of fact on mere affidavits;
for instance, on the hearing of a motion for summary judgment or
the question as to whether a defendant is doing business in the
State so as to be amenable for service, or motions to quash service
of summons, motions for restraining orders or preliminary injunctions, or motions for new trial. All of these motions may be submitted upon affidavits or may be heard wholly or partially on oral
testimony or depositions. This rule should be of service to the
court and to counsel in obviating the often unsatisfactory method of
determining motions on affidavits. 2
Rule 43.06 comments on the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur. The
inclusion of this rule is a noticeable departure from the Federal
rule under the general title of "Evidence" in that the Minnesota
rule includes an exposition of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. In
simple, concise language the rule states that res ipsa is nothing
more than a form of circumstantial evidence which creates a permissive inference of negligence. The rule also sets at rest any question regarding the use of the doctrine even though plaintiff has
pleaded or proven specific acts of negligence. 3 According to the
notes of the Advisory Committee, which presented the tentative
draft of the Minnesota Rules, res ipsa arises in Minnesota where
(1) the accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the
absence of someone's negligence; (2) it is caused by an instru2. See Eccles v. Peoples' Bank, 333 U. S. 426 (1948) which cautions
against the use of affidavits in the determination of motions "because of its
proven insufficiencies."
3. See Heffter v. Northern States Power Co., 173 Minn. 215, 217 N.
W. 102 (1927).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:672

mentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; and (3) the
possibility of contributing conduct which would make plaintiff
responsible is eliminated. You vill note that the requirement that
evidence as to the explanation of the accident is more readily
accessible to the defendant than to the plaintiff is not included in
the above. Apparently the better reasoned decisions do not make
that requirement essential as long as the circumstances of the
accident give rise to a reasonable inference of negligence. Some
courts hold that the plea of specific acts of negligence prohibits the
application of res ipsa. But in Minnesota it now seems clear that if
negligence is alleged in general. terms as to the care and maintenance
of the particular instrumentality which caused the accident, the
doctrine is available even though specific acts of negligence may be
set forth. 4 Of course, this rule, 43.06, does not change the present
law in the State of Minnesota. Rather, it serves to clarify and
simplify the rule and emphasizes that the rule, after all, is nothing
more than a permissible inference of negligence which may arise
under certain circumstances. However, as you well know, the inference does not shift the burden of proof. It may be rebutted and
overcome by the defendant, but the burden of proof to establish
negligence always rests upon -the plaintiff. In the last analysis, it is
generally for the jury to say whether the inference of negligence
sustains the burden of proof which rests upon the plaintiff. Obviously, the inference is not conclusive of the defendant's liability.
Rule 44. Pro af of Official Record
Section 600.13 of the Minnesota statutes is not superseded but
merely supplemented by this rule. The rule may be referred to as
largely mechanical in that it is designed to provide a "simple and
uniform method of proving public records or the entry or lack of
entry therein." Rule 44 does not purport to deal with the admissibility of such documents or records, but rather the manner in
which they may be proved if they are admissible.
Rule 45.04. Subpoena for Taking Depositions; Place of
Examination
Under this rule it will be noted that a resident of this State is
required to attend an examination only in the county wherein he
resides or is employed or transacts his business in person or at
4. See Kienman v. Banner Laundry Co., 150 finn. 515, 186 N. W. 123
(1921).
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such other convenient place as is fixed by order of court. However,
a non-resident of the State may be required to obey a subpoena and
attend a hearing in any county of the State. This section apparently
supersedes § 597.11 of the statutes which is to the effect that any
witness may be subpoenaed and give his depositions at any place
within 20 miles of his abode.
Rule 46. Exceptions Unnecessary
This rule does not change the current Minnesota rule as set
forth in § 547.03 of the Minnesota statutes. All that counsel needs
to do during the trial is to make his objection to any ruling or
order of the court, or to make known to the court the action that
he desires the court to take and in all instances to state his grounds
therefor. Upon so proceeding, he need not take an exception to
every ruling. Sometimes I appreciate that, in order to emphasize his
utter disagreement and sometimes his contempt of the court's lack
of understanding of the elementary rules of evidence, counsel cannot
restrain himself from audibly taking an exception. However, having
thus vented his feelings on one or more occasions, he should
recognize that in a jury case especially where his persistence may
be misunderstood, he should not persist in doing a futile thing.
Rule 47. Jurors
Rule 47.01 supersedes Rule 27(a) of the District Court Rules.
That rule, as you remember, required the court to first examine
jurors and thereafter he was authorized to permit counsel to proceed with additional inquiry. In all probability, the present rule will
not substantially change the practice in the examination of jurors.
If the court does conduct the preliminary examination, the new
rule provides that the court shall permit the parties or their attorneys to supplement the examination by such further inquiry as the
court deems proper. There is, of course, the prerogative of the
court to limit the supplemental examination, but if counsel proceeds in an expeditious and sensible manner in asking pertinent
and appropriate questions not already covered by the court's examination, it may be assumed that he will not be unduly restricted in this
regard. It may not be amiss to remind counsel, however, that no
litigant is entitled to a jury of his liking. He is only entitled to an
impartial jury. Many times in the examination of jurors, it is
apparent that counsel, by the very nature of the questions. asked,
are not bent upon obtaining an impartial jury, but rather twelve
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men and women whom they believe will be more favorable to
their side of the litigation than to their adversaries. If the court's
questions fairly cover the necessary examination of the jurors,
counsel are apt to weaken their position before the jury by propounding duplicitous or frivolous questions.
Rule 47.02, Alternate Jurors. There is an important change in
this rule. It is to be found in the provision which permits the court
to replace the regular juror or jurors with alternate jurors not only
when a juror dies or becomes disabled through illness, but also to replace those jurors who may become disqualified or unable to perform
their duties for any reason. Therefore, if it should appear during
the trial that a juror is disqualified by reason of prejudice, or if the
juror is tampered with, or if it is discovered during the trial that
there are facts and circumstances which if known when the juror
was selected would have disqualified him, the court in its discretion
could appoint an alternate juror to replace him. Consequently, the
danger of mistrial would thus be obviated and unnecessary loss of
time and expense prevented. For some reason not entirely apparent,
the superseded iinnesota statute, § 546.095, provided in the selection of alternate jurors that tile plaintiff should be entitled to one
peremptory challenge and the defendant to two. The present rule,
however, allows only one challenge to either party.
Rule 49. Special Verdicts and Interrogatories
This rule may justify an extended comment. The term "special
verdict" is sometimes loosely used and is confused with written
interrogatories which accompany a general verdict. Special interrogatories are often helpful in that they require the jury to answer
certain key questions of fact which should not be overlooked in
arriving at a general verdict. But under such practice, the court
will charge the jury as to the law and generally proceed in giving
his instructions as he would without such interrogatories. On the
other hand, the special verdict submitted to the jury either as a
verdict in the form of special written findings upon each issue of
fact or written questions as to issues of fact susceptible of categorical
or other brief answers, differs markedly from the procedure followed
when special interrogatories are used. Under the special verdict
practice, the court would not discuss the law except as it would be
necessary to explain or amplify the questions submitted. Nor would
the court inform the jury as -to the effect of their answer on the
ultimate disposition which would be made of the case. Under this
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practcie, the jury would make findings of ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts or immaterial issues, and then the court would apply
the law to such facts and enter judgment accordingly. In theory, at
least, under the special verdict practice, the jury is called upon to
perform the duties of arbiters of fact, free from prejudice, bias, or
sympathy, which often results when they are taking ballots on
whether the verdict should be in favor of the plaintiff or the dedendant. And illustrative of the purpose to emphasize the facts
in submitting a special verdict rather than the parties, the court
is not required to instruct the jury as to which party has the burden
of proof. The jury is simply asked to determine whether by the
greater weight of the evidence certain facts are true; that is, it is
recognized that the better practice is to point out where the burden
lies, not upon whom. It is quite apparent, therefore, that the whole
thought behind the special verdict practice is to free the jury from
any procedure which would inject the feeling of partisanship in
their minds and limit their deliberations to the specific fact questions submitted. Furthermore, the jury will be relieved of the often
difficult task of endeavoring to apply involved principles of law to
the issues of fact, which must be done in the event a general verdict
is called for. Assume, for instance, that the matter under consideration involved a suit on a fire insurance policy in which the defense
of the company was as follows: First, that the plaintiff permitted
gasoline to be stored on the premises contrary to the provisions
of the policy, and second, that plaintiff swore falsely in the proof
of loss. Assume further that the fire and the amount of the loss
were admitted, so that the only fact issues were the ones above
stated. The court under the special verdict practice would probably
submit the first question in a form substantially as follows:
Does it appear from the greater weight of the evidence that
plaintiff permitted gasoline to be stored on the premises? Answer "Yes" or "No".
The second question would be submitted in substantially the same
form so as to read:
Does it appear from the greater weight of the evidence that
plaintiff swore falsely in the proof of loss? Answer "Yes" or
"No".
If either question were answered in the affirmative, plaintiff's cause
of action would be defeated. The jury, however, would not render
a general verdict. The court would enter judgment accordingly on
the answers submitted. Many law writers, as well as jurists in
Wisconsin and Texas, where the special verdict practice has been
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followed for years, believe that their practice is far superior to the
general verdict system which, according to them, is singularly
adapted to the burying of some of the gravest errors which occur
in the entire gamut of litigatiDn. But the history of this practice
in the States which have followed it will not justify the conclusion
that it is a panacea for the many shortcomings of our jury trials.
The reversals and mistrials in cases following the special verdict
procedure appear to be fully as many as in trials where a general
verdict is returned. The defender, however, of the special verdict
practice could probably reply that the errors occurring where the
special verdict is used are brought out in the open, but that no one
can determine the many errors which have crept into the shelter
afforded by the general verdict system. The special verdict practice
is authorized by the Minnesota statute, §§ 546.19 and 546.20, the
latter being superseded by Rule 49.01 and 49.02. Section 546.19
provides, in part:
"A special verdict is one by which they [the jury] find the
facts only, and it shall so present the conclusions of fact as established by the evidence that nothing remains to the court but to
draw from them conclusions of law."
And § 546.20 provides, in part:
"I every action for the recovery of money only or specific
real property, the jury, in their discretion, may render a general
or special verdict. In all other cases the court may direct the
jury to find a special verdict in writing upon all or any of the
issues."
But the special verdict practice has not been used in this State to
any extent. There have been so many pitfalls and uncertainties encountered under the present Minnesota statute that its use has not
been justified. However, under Rule 49.01 the court is vested with
the sole discretion in requiring a jury to follow special verdict
procedure. The Minnesota statute apparently followed the common law rule of placing the control in the hands of the jury as to
whether a special or general verdict should be returned in every
action for the recovery of money only or specific real property.
However, attention may be called to Morrow v. St. Paul City Railway Co.,5 where the Supreme Court held that it was discretionary
with the court to permit or refuse a special verdict. In Wisconsin,
for instance, under statute a special verdict must be rendered if
requested by either party or directed by the court.
Under the present special verdict rule, which was adapted atter
5. 74 Afinn. 480, 77 N. W. 303 (1898).
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the Federal rule, some of the pitfalls experienced in the States
which have adopted this practice, seem to be obviated; for instance,
if any issue of fact raised by the pleadings or evidence is not submitted, each party waives his right of trial by jury as to such issue,
unless before the jury retires, he demands submission of such issue
or issues, and as to any such issues omitted without such demand,
the court may make a finding, and if it fails to do so, it shall be
deemed to have made a finding in accord with the judgment on
the special verdict.
The use of special verdicts has not been frequent in the Federal
Court of this District since the rule was adopted. And it probably
will not be until the Bar of the State in state court practice becomes familiar with its use and utilizes the rule. Federal courts are
hesitant to depart materially from state practice. After all, we are
in most cases merely administering Minnesota law and applying it
to the issues before us. And then again, in many cases, it seems
that little is to be gained from the use of the special verdict procedure. In the ordinary personal injury case, for instance, under the
special verdict practice, the jury would be required to make a
finding as to plaintiff's charges of negligence, as to proximate
cause, as to the question of contributory negligence, and also make
a finding as to damages in the event plaintiff is to recover. It does
not seem that much would be gained by adopting the special verdict
procedure in such litigation. The same danger of partisanship and
sympathy would arise under the special verdict procedure as under
the so-called general verdict procedure.
I have followed in a few matters the special verdict practice.
Some time ago, a switchman employed by the Great Northern
brought an action against his employer seeking damages under the
Federal Employers Liability Act upon the grounds that the employer had failed to exercise reasonable care to afford him a reasonably safe place to work. He was engaged at the time of the accident in performing his switching duties and it was at night time
when he was walking under the Seventh Street Bridge in Minneapolis, which is erected over the Great Northern tracks, when a
timber fell from the bridge and struck him on the head. The bridge
was being constructed by the State, which had let the contract to a
general contractor and the general contractor had sublet the steel
work to a sub-contractor. There was evidence that the Great Northern had notice of the timbers and other debris falling off the bridge
and thus from time to time endangering the workmen of the rail-
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road who were required to per-orm their switching duties under the
bridge. The Great Northern brought in both contractors as thirdparty defendants in that it was contended that their negligence was
the dominant negligence which caused the accident. I should say
that the Great Northern had nothing to do with the construction of
the bridge. At the trial I submitted a general verdict as between
the switchman and the Great Northern, but as to the issue between
the Great Northern and the sub-contractor, which after the evidence
was in was the only third party remaining, I submitted two questions in the form of a special verdict; first, as to whether or not
a timber did fall off the bridge and strike the switchman as he
contended, and secondly, whether or not the timber's falling off
the bridge was the proximate result of the negligence of the subcontractor. The jury were not asked to return any general verdict
as to any recovery over by the Great Northern as against the subcontractor and upon the questions submitted to the jury the court
will make findings and determine the liability over of the contractor
to the Great Northern.
There is much to be said for the use of the special verdict. The
indubitable advantage of the special verdict is the formulation and
submission of special fact issues which enable the jury to have before
them the particular issues which they must determine rather than a
jumbling of all of the alleged issues or defenses with an omnibus
question for them to determine. The trial of jury cases will never
be an exact science, nor will it approach mathematical perfection.
The special verdict may bring us to a closer approximation of that
ideal.
Rule 49.02 pertains to the use of a General Verdict Accompanied
by Answers to Interrogatories. The apparent difference between the
use of interrogatories which accompany a general verdict under
the Minnesota statute and this rule is to be found in the provision
of the rule which purports to meet the difficulties which arise when
the answers are inconsistent with one another or with the general
verdict. The rule provides that if they are consistent with each
other, but one or more is inconsistent with the general verdict, the
court may direct judgment in accordance with the answers notwithstanding the general verdict, or he may send the jury back for
further deliberations or order a new trial. Generally, I assume under
these circumstances the court would call to the attention of the jury
the inconsistencies between their answers and the general verdict
and send them back for further deliberation. However, where the
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answers are not only inconsistent with each other, but one or more
is inconsistent with the general verdict, the court is required to
send the jury back for further consideration or to discharge the jury
and order a new trial.8 The submission of interrogatories to a jury
with a general verdict is often desirable in that it centers attention
of the jury on the important issues which they must pass upon
before they determine the general verdict that should be returned.
Further, it aids them in checking the soundness of the general verdict which they have agreed upon. Too often juries tend to generalize in their deliberations and merely determine whether the plaintiff
or defendant should recover without deliberating upon the crucial
questions which are conditions precedent to the general verdict.

Rule 50.01. Directed Verdict; When Mlade; Effect
This rule follows in substance the Federal rule and sets at rest
any question as to the right of the court to direct a verdict at the
close of plaintiff's case. Apparently there has been some doubt
about the propriety of that practice. As late as 1938, in Willard v.
Kohen the Supreme Court said:
"It is a common practice in this State for the court to direct
a verdict for the defendant, when the plaintiff rests without proving a cause of action. The practice is unauthorized by statute and
objectionable. It is the clear intent of our statute that upon the
failure of plaintiff to prove a cause of action, a dismissal should
be ordered rather than a verdict directed. The latter course
should be followed only after defendant
rests and there has been
'' 7
an actual contest upon the merits.

It will be noted further that under Rule 50.01 when a party
moves for a directed verdict at the close of the testimony of
the opponent, if the motion is denied the party making the motion
has the right to offer evidence in the same manner as if the motion
had not been made. Consequently, there is no necessity for the
moving party to obtain leave of the court to proceed with testimony
if the motion is denied. Some courts have taken the position that
where both parties make a motion for directed verdicts, it is tantamount to a waiver of a jury trial because both parties contend that
there are no issues of fact for the jury to determine. Under such
circumstances it has been the practice in some courts to discharge
the jury and proceed as in a jury-waived matter. This was the practice, at least, in Federal Court for many years. However, the present
6. See Theurer v. Holland Furnace Co., 124 F. 2d 494 (10th Cir. 1941).

7. 202 Minn. 626, 629, 279 N. W. 553, 554 (1938) quoting from 6 Dunnell's Minn. Digest § 9751 (2d ed. 1928).
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Minnesota rule leaves no doubt as to the right of jury trial, even
though all parties to the acticn have moved for a directed verdict,
if the motions are denied.
Rule 50.02 covers the procedure which must be followed with
reference to the granting of a motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict. It differs materially from the present Federal rule and
also from the former Minnesota practice. In other words, it is not
necessary to move for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence
in order to be entitled to present a motion non obstante after verdict
or disagreement. Heretofore, a motion for a directed verdict at the
close of the evidence was essential in order to be heard on any motion for judgment notwithstanding. It may be suggested that where
a motion for directed verdict is not made at the close of the testimony, a litigant may be lulled into a feeling of security thinking
that there is an issue for the jury, and where a motion for a directed
verdict is made he might be afforded the opportunity by the court
to supply some technical bit of evidence which was lacking in his
proof. There may be some merit to this view. However, a trial
court can always grant a new trial if an injustice will be done by
such an incident. In view of the fact that a motion for directed verdict need not be made at the close of the evidence, the tendency may
be for counsel to forego such a motion and allow more cases to go
to the jury because they will always have the right to make a motion
for judgment notwithstanding in the event the jury's verdict is adverse. And likewise there may be a tendency for trial courts to allow
more cases to go to the jury, and persuasive argument may be made
for such a practice because if -he case goes to the jury and a verdict
is returned for the plaintiff, for instance, the court can grant on a
a motion judgment for defendant, and if an appeal is taken, the
appellate court, if it disagrees with the trial court, can reinstate
the verdict and thus obviate the expense of a new trial, while if a
directed verdict is granted, then, of course, if the court erred, the
only alternative would be to grant a new trial. You will observe
that when a motion is made in the alternative after the verdict, the
rule provides that if the court grants the motion for judgment notwithstanding, the court shall at the same time grant or deny
the motion for a new trial, and in such a situation the order on the
motion for a new trial shall become effective only if judgment notwithstanding the verdict is reversed, vacated, or set aside. 8 Where
8. It is to be gathered that this rule is patterned after the practice advocated by Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U. S. 243 (1943). See
also McGinley v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. P. Ry. Co., 152 Minn. 48, 187
N. W. 829 (1922).
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the trial court grants judgment notwithstanding the verdict and
denies a new trial, the appellate court on appeal may reverse
the judgment notwithstanding and reinstate the verdict. If the trial
court denies a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
and denies a new trial, the losing party may appeal and assign as
error both the failure to grant judgment as requested, or the alternative, a new trial. Thus the appellate court may determine, first,
whether judgment should have been entered notwithstanding the
verdict, and if not, whether a new trial should be granted. However, it should be observed that under this rule the court is only required to rule on the motion for a new trial if it grants the motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
Instructions to the jury and objections thereto are covered
by Rule 51. This rule as adopted differs from the Federal rule and
also departs from and supersedes § 546.14 of the linnesota statutes,
which states, in part:
"The court of its own motion may, and upon request of either
party, shall, lay before the parties before the commencement of
the argument any instructions which it will give in its charge,
and all such instructions may be read to the jury by either party
as a part of his argument."
It is to be doubted that this portion of the statute has been utilized
to any extent by counsel except to have the court in an informal
manner acquaint counsel as to the charge to be given as to any particular issues. This requirement is absent from Rule 51 and all
that is now required is that at the close of the evidence, but before
arguments, or at such earlier time as the court reasonably directs,
written requests as to instructions may be presented to the court
by counsel. Then the court as before should note on the request
the ruling as, given, given as modified, or refused. It should be
noted that the rule provides that unintentional misstatements in the
charge or omissions or verbal errors must be objected to before the
jury retires, with the grounds of the of the objection distinctly
indicated. Otherwise, any such objection is waived and no party
may assign errors thereon. However, errors with respect to fundamental law or controlling principles may be assigned as error on a
motion for new trial without objections being made at the close
of the charge. This latter provision with respect to the distinction
between unintentional misstatements, etc., and controlling principles
follows the present Minnesota practice.
Referring to Rule 51 on the general subject of "Instructions to
jury," it perhaps would not be amiss to remind counsel that no case
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of any importance, and I suppose all cases in a sense are important,
should go to the jury without counsel having prepared written requests covering the instructions on all controlling principles of law.
Not only is this practice generally necessary in order to preserve
your record, but it also tends to bring to the attention of the court
principles of law which may have escaped it, and it will generally
result in more complete and satisfactory instructions on the part
of the court. Unprepared counsel in the trial of a lawsuit often results in an unprepared judge. But in formulating your requests for
instructions, avoid partisanship on factual issues or argumentative
instructions, and also avoid as far as possible requests on routine
and formal matters which as a general rule the court will cover
without any requests therefor. The presentation to the court of some
20 or 30 requests covering elementary instructions and rulings
thereon are time-consuming to both court and counsel.

Rule 52 pertains to Findings by the Court, and Rule 52.01 is
entitled "Effect." This rule fairly conforms to the present Minnesota statute except the provision with reference to the requirement that the judges dispose of their decisions within five months
or incur the penalty of non-payment of their salaries. Then, you
will note that findings are necessary in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions. This provision of the rule must be strictly
followed in order to avoid error notwithstanding that many interlocutory injunctions are granted or denied upon affidavits and it is
often difficult to formulate satisfactory findings on a showing of that
kind. Observe further that requests for findings are not necessary
for the purposes of review. The rule provides further that findings
are not required where judgments on the pleadings are granted
or in case of summary judgment, but the court must make findings
where a dismissal on the merits is granted at the end of plaintiff's
testimony as permitted in Rule 41.02.
Rule 52.02 covers motions for amendments to findings. Generally, it may be stated that the primary purpose of Rule 52.02 is
to enable the appellate court to obtain a correct understanding of the
fact issues determined by the trial court as a basis for the conclusions of law and judgment entered thereon. A motion under this
section may look to a modification of the findings, or additional
findings with a modification of the judgment if necessary. But is it
proper for the moving party to seek a complete reversal of the
judgment which has been entered? There has been divergence of
opinion on that question. Professor Moore is commenting upon
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Federal Rule 52(b), which is substantially the same as Minnesota
Rule 52.02, had this to say:
"A motion for amendment of findings or for additional findings should be limited to modification of the judgment entered
or to amplification or expansion of the facts found; it is not
proper for the moving party to seek a reversal of the judgment
entered or a finding of contrary facts."
He cited, among other decisions, Matyas v. Feddish,'0 where the
District Court of Pennsylvania had before it a motion for amended
findings and the purport of the motion was to ask the court to amend
its findings of fact and conclusions of law with the effect that it
would amount to a reversal of the judgment. Judge Watson of that
court made the following comment:
"The purpose of Rule 52 is to clarify matters for the appellate
court's better understanding of the basis of the decision of the
trial court. Tulsa City Lines v. Mains, 10 Cir., 107 F. 2d 377.
The rule permits the Court in its discretion to 'amend' findings
of fact or to 'make additional findings,' thus amplifying and
expanding the facts. The rule does not provide for a reversal
of the judgment or for a denial of the facts as found, which is
what the plaintiff requests at present.
"The plaintiff might have proceeded by motion for a new
trial or by appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals from the judgment entered in the trial court. It is clear that Rule 52(b) does
not provide for that which is sought by the plaintiff here, and
plaintiff's request will be denied.""
Moreover, when the Minnesota Supreme Court Advisory Committee prepared the proposed Minnesota rules, it included Professor
Moore's comment quoted above with reference to the tentative
Rule 52.02, which is the same as the present Minnesota Rule 52.02.
However, in a later edition, Professor Moore makes the following
comment on Federal Rule 52(b) :
"There is also authority that it is not proper for a party to
move for amendments or additional findings that in effect seek a
reversal of the judgment. [Citing Matyas v. Feddish.] But this,
also, is too narrow a view, particularly in light of the close relationship of Rule 52(b) and the power of the court under Rule
59(b) and (d) to grant a new trial and its power under Rule
59 (e) to alter or amend a judgment. If the trial court has entered
an erroneous judgment it should correct it. This doctrine is subject, of course, to the proposition that action directed to that
end be taken 'not later than 10 days after entry of judgment' for
the purpose of promoting the finality of judgments...."12

9. See 3 Moore, Federal Practice 178 (Supp. 1950 to 1st ed.).
10. 4 F. ILD. 385 (N.D. Pa. 1945).

11. Id. at 386.

12. See 5 Moore, Federal Practice 2685-2686 (2d ed. 1951).
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It will be observed, therefore, that Professor Moore has departed
from the view expressed in his 1950 edition as to the propriety of a
motion under this rule for a complete reversal of the judgment
entered. The Minnesota rules do not include Federal Rule 59(e),
to which Professor Moore referred, and which reads:
"A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served
not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment."
This subdivision is new in the Federal Rules, and apparently it
was added in order to make it clear that the District Court possessed
the power to alter or amend a judgment in a situation which arose
in Boaz v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York. 13 It appeared in that
case that the court dismissed the action without prejudice at the
close of plaintiff's case. Two days thereafter, however, upon
motion of the defendant, the dismissal was amended so as to be a
judgment of dismissal with prejudice. The Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit held that the court bad this power. But the question, however, which arose in that case seemed to justify the amendment to the rule in adding 59(e). It is to be doubted that 59(e) is
determinative of the scope of the relief which a motion under 52.02
may invoke. This rule specifically provides that there may be a
modification of the judgment, and obviously if the moving party can
convince the trial court that it should reverse itself, no good reason is
suggested why such power does not rest in the trial court under
the present Minnesota rule empowering the trial court to modify its
findings or make additional findings with a modification of the
judgment.

14

Granted, therefore, that a motion under Rule 52.02 which in
effect seeks a reversal of the judgment is permitted, it must be
remembered that such relief is not the primary purpose of the rule.
If the losing party intends to appeal, he should direct the court's
attention to the additions or modifications of the findings which will
disclose the basis for the court's conclusions more clearly to the
appellate court and not attemp: merely to supplant in toto the court's
findings with findings favorable to the losing party.
Rule 54.02. Judgment upon Multiple Claims
This rule was adopted for the purpose of obviating doubt as to
13. 146 F. 2d 321 (8th Cir. *1944).

14. See also Leishman v. Associated Wholesale Electric Co., 318 U. S.
203 (1943) where the Supreme Court apparently assumed that a motion
under Federal Rule 52(b) to amend findings of fact and conclusions of law
in a patent case which would result in a reversal of the judgment entered
properly invoked the court's jurisdiction under that rule and tolled the time
for appeal until an order was made disposing of the motion.

1952]

NEW MINNESOTA RULES
12]

the finality of any determination of one or more initial phases of litigation and to avoid the possible injustice which might be occasioned
by delay in the entry of a final judgment on account of awaiting the
determination of the entire controversy. The Minnesota rule conforms to the present Federal rule as amended in 1948. Prior to
this amendment of the Federal rule, considerable confusion arose
as to whether an order disposing of a separate claim was a final decision in the case, and hence appealable. The test seemed to be that
the claim had to be separate and distinct. Thus, in an order disposing of a permissive counterclaim, it was held that it was appealable because the counterclaim did not necessarily arise out of the
transaction which formed the basis for the main action, while a
compulsory counterclaim did arise out of the same occasion or
transaction and hence was not distinct and separate, and hence
not appealable. But now, as the Federal and Minnesota rule is
framed, an order disposing of part of the controversy is only appealable in case the court makes an express direction for the entry of
judgment and an express determination that there is no just reason for delay. Therefore, the court may now direct entry of a final
judgment upon one or more but less than all the claims if the rule
is complied with as required. The Federal court has recognized
many claims as being separate and distinct although they are combined in an action with other claims. For instance, there was a complaint setting out two counts, one for recovery on an insurance
policy and the other for the reformation of the policy, and judgment
was entered dismissing the first count. This order of dismissal was
appealable even though no final judgment had been entered disposing of the entire controversy.'"
And in connection with this rule, see Rule 62.06, which covers
stay of judgment in multiple claims.
Rule 58.01. Entry
Generally, under the present Minnesota practice, a judgment is
not entered upon the verdict of the jury until costs are taxed upon
application of one of the parties. However, I believe that the clerk
under the present Minnesota practice may enter judgment on a verdict without order of court, or without the application of one of
the parties. The practice, however, has been, as you know, to await
the taxation of costs before judgment is entered on a jury verdict.
However, under the present rule, the clerk, unless the court directs
15. Hanney v. Franklin Fire Ins. Co. of Philadelphia, 142 F. 2d 864
(9th Cir. 1944).
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otherwise, enters judgment forthwith on the verdict of the jury.
The clerk, therefore, does not wait for an entry of costs if an appeal
is taken, and the appeal goes forward. If, later on, the prevailing
party enters costs, the judgment reflects such additions, but the
appeal is not stayed or delayed by reason of any failure of the prevailing party to go forward with his taxation of costs.
Rule .58.02. Stay
The Minnesota statute, § 547.023, provides that, upon the filing
of a verdict or a decision by the court, an order may be entered
staying the proceedings not to exceed 40 days, but that the stay
may be extended upon notice where the court reporter is unable
for good cause to prepare a transcript. It is further provided that a
stay of proceedings may be extended upon application of either
party upon notice and good cause shown therefor where a transcript
of the testimony was ordered from the court reporter within a reasonable time after the verdict or decision. Rule 58.02 supersedes the
present Minnesota statute, and now a stay may be entered, as you
will note, for a period not exceeding the time required for hearing
and determination of a motion for new trial, or judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or a motion to dismiss the action or for
amended findings, and after such determination the court may order
a stay of entry of judgment for not more than 30 days.
My final observation on the rules under "Trials" will refer to
Rule 63.01. You will note that this rule regarding the disability of a
judge is considerably broader in its scope than the prior pertinent
statutory provisions. Under this rule any judge assigned to the court
may perform the duties of a judge who is disabled and unable to perform the duties assigned to him under the rules after a verdict is returned or findings and conclusions are filed. Section 542.16 of the
Minnesota statutes is now superseded by Rules 63.03 and 63.04 and
a practical method is provided for the assignment of another judge
by the Chief Justice to a district where a judge is disqualified by
reason of bias or prejudice or by reason of an affidavit of prejudice
being filed.

